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WHY VOUCHERS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL,
AND WHY THEY'RE NOT
ABNER S. GREENE*
To answer the question whether school vouchers are uncon-
stitutional when used for religious schools, I will first consider
the role the Establishment Clause plays in our constitutional
scheme, and will suggest that the core value promoted by the
Establishment Clause is not jeopardized by voucher programs. I
will also respond to Dean Sullivan's argument that voucher pro-
grams are invalid under the Establishment Clause because they
represent a kind of government speech promoting religion.1
Then I will turn to the Free Exercise Clause, and will maintain
that compelling a citizen to support financially someone else's
religious institution disrupts the voluntarist baseline of free exer-
cise. Because of the distinctiveness with which our Constitution
treats religion, we should construe the Free Exercise Clause as
mandating pro rata taxpayer refunds of voucher money used to
support another's church or synagogue. Next, I will outline the
doctrinal argument against certain voucher programs. Finally, I
will add a word about Pierce v. Society of Sisters,2 suggesting a new
framework for thinking about public and private schooling.
I. VOUCHERS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. The Hegemony of Dominant Religions
What does the Establishment Clause prevent that the Free
Exercise Clause doesn't already prevent? Since the.Free Exercise
Clause already forbids government from coercing religious belief
or practice, the Establishment Clause must have content beyond
an anti-coercion rule. Most would agree that the Establishment
Clause prevents government from establishing a preferred reli-
gion. Is that the end of the matter?
The better view is that the religion clauses together ensure
religious pluralism, which means that the dominant religion may
not use government to advance its doctrinal religious ends, and
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law. B.A. 1982, Yale
University; J.D. 1986, University of Michigan.
1. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades, Public Squares and Voucher Payments:
Problems of Government Neutrality, 28 CONN. L. Rsv. 243, 254-58 (1996).
2. 68,U.S. 510 (1925).
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which also means that the dominant religion may (and in some
cases must) aid minority religions.' Three lines of Supreme
Court case law should be considered correct under this anti-
hegemony view of the Establishment Clause.
In the first line of cases, the Court four times invalidated
laws on the ground that they were enacted for a predominantly
religious purpose, i.e., that the dominant religion had sought to
advance its doctrinal religious ends through the use of law.
Thus, in Epperson v. Arkansas,4 the Court ruled that the legislature
had been impermissibly captured by a fundamentalist lobby, and
that the resulting ban on the teaching of evolution in public
schools was invalid because it was based on a predominantly reli-
gious purpose. In Edwards v. Aguillard,5 the Court forbade a state
from achieving an end run around Epperson, by invalidating a law
that required creation science to be taught if evolution were
taught. Again, the Court located an impermissible dominant
religious purpose behind the law. Similarly in Stone v. Graham6
and Wallace v. Jaffree,7 the Court invalidated laws because they
were each animated by a predominantly religious purpose. This
line of cases should stand, for it serves as a bulwark against the
manipulation of the legislative process to serve the doctrinal
ends of a dominant religion.
In the second line of case law, the Court correctly required
the removal of the creche atop the staircase inside the Allegheny
County Courthouse, on the ground that a reasonable observer
would conclude that the government was endorsing the Chris-
tian faith.8 Governmental use of religious symbols on govern-
ment property is another way for the dominant religion to use
law to achieve hegemony, and such symbols should be invali-
dated. Thus, the Court was probably wrong not to invalidate a
governmentally sponsored creche in a public park in Lynch v.
Donnelly,9 although the association of the creche with the govern-
ment as sponsor was less clear there than in the Allegheny case.
And the Court was probably correct in the Allegheny case not to
invalidate a large menorah placed on public property next to a
3. See Abner S. Greene, The Irreducible Constitution, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
IsSUES 293, 302-11 (1996).
4. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
5. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
6. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (law requiring the posting of the Ten
Commandments on the walls of public school classrooms).
7. 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (law mandating a moment for silence or prayer at
the beginning of the public school day).
8. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
9. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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large Christmas tree, because a reasonable observer would not
assume the government was endorsing a minority religion.
In the third line of cases, the Court correctly invalidated gov-
ernment-sponsored prayer in public school.1" The proper justifi-
cation for the school prayer cases is a structural one: the
government should have no role in advancing prayer, for the risk
is too high that the dominant religion will use such occasions to
advance its doctrinal ends.11 I would not rely, as the Court did in
Lee v. Weisman,12 on a psychological coercion theory to invalidate
school prayer.
Programs that fund religious schools often do not raise the
sort of problem raised by the religious purpose, symbols, and
prayer cases. If the funding program is general-i.e., if the gov-
ernment funds secular as well as religious schools-then the pro-
gram does not advance the doctrinal ends of the dominant
religion, for many religions might be aided. It is possible that in
a particular jurisdiction at a particular time a voucher program
might be used primarily to bolster the religious schools of the
dominant sect. If this could be shown, the program should be
invalidated under the Establishment Clause. But in many (per-
haps most) cases a voucher program will benefit the schools of
many religions. Such programs do not violate the Establishment
Clause because the hegemony of the dominant religion is not
thereby established.
The concern often raised about such general funding pro-
grams-that some government money is going to church cof-
fers-is a serious matter, but is better considered as a Free
Exercise Clause concern. I turn to that in Part II.
B. The Government Speech Problem
Dean Sullivan offers another approach to invalidating
voucher programs under the Establishment Clause.' 3 She
describes two cases dealing, in part, with the attribution of the
speech of one actor to another actor. In Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the University of Virginia,4 the Court held that govern-
mentally compelled student activity fees could be used to fund an
evangelical Christian student newspaper, so long as the fees also
10. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
11. See Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FoRDHAM L.
Rnv. 451, 469-72 (1995).
12. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
13. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 254-58.
14. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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funded a wide range of nonreligious student speech. The Court
reasoned, in part, that because the fees were available broadly,
people would not attribute the religious speech (or any of the
funded speech) to the government. In Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,15 the Court held uncon-
stitutional a state law's required inclusion of a gay and lesbian
group marching with their banner in a St. Patrick's Day parade
against the wishes of the parade's private sponsors. The Court
reasoned that people would attribute the group's message to the
sponsors, thus violating the sponsors' right not to be associated
with ideas with which they disagreed.
Sullivan maintains that if voucher money is used to fund reli-
gious schools, the religious message advanced by those schools
will be attributed to the provider of the funds, the government.
That is, she says the attribution of X's speech to Y in the voucher
case is like that in the parade case (reasonable observer would
make such an attribution) and not like that in the student fees
case (reasonable observer would not make such an attribu-
tion).1 6 This argument is weak. Cases such as Hurley do reveal
situations in which the speech of one might be attributed to
another. But other cases, such as Rosenberger and cases involving
classic public forums such as parks and streets, involve a multi-
tude of private speakers, none of whose messages are attributable
to the property owner, the government. The generality of
voucher programs, combined with the fact that each family, and
not the government, decides how to use the voucher money,
belies Sullivan's argument, and renders voucher programs far
closer to cases such as Rosenberger and classic public forums than
to cases such as Hurley. The reasonable observer would not attri-
bute to the government the message of any school benefited by
voucher money. Rather, such an observer would assume that the
government is funding all schools, and thus is supporting the
message of none. To be sure, when the government runs a
monopoly and supports only the public schools, then one might
reasonably attribute the content of the curriculum to the govern-
ment. I would even agree that in a world of both public schools
and voucher-supported private schools, one might reasonably
attribute the content of the public school curriculum to the gov-
ernment. But because the voucher program is general and
because parents, and not the government, decide where money
from each voucher ends up, one would not reasonably attribute
the content of the private school classroom (religious or secular)
15. 15 U.S. 557 (1995).
16. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 254-58.
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to the government. I agree with Sullivan that government may
not endorse religion, but disagree that voucher programs consti-
tute such an endorsement.
II. VOUCHERS AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The two principal Establishment Clause arguments against
the use of vouchers for religious schooling fail-(l) most
voucher programs will not operate to advance the doctrinal inter-
ests of the dominant religion, but rather to support all religions;
and (2) the reasonable observer would not attribute the doctri-
nal message of religious schools to the provider of the funds, the
government. But a Free Exercise Clause objection remains, and
it is a serious one. Our conception of free exercise stems from a
voluntarist conception of religion. Religion must be voluntarily
chosen, not compelled. (Even if religion is a duty, and not a
choice, it is a duty to God and not to the state.) Forcing me to
spend my money on religious doctrines with which I disagree
(and even, perhaps, with which I agree, but put that to one side)
is improper because it violates this voluntarist baseline of free
exercise. The compulsion here isn't as bad as forcing me to prac-
tice another's religion (or to cease from practicing my own), but
it is still problematic.
Currently, this concern with compulsion provides no doctri-
nal basis for rejecting vouchers, but perhaps we can borrow from
the free speech case law. The Court has, beginning with West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,17 decided a series of
cases involving compelled speech. Sometimes the Court has
invalidated laws compelling speech; 8 other times it has upheld
such laws.19 Locating a cogent analytical line between these two
sets of cases is difficult, and I will not attempt to do so here.
Moreover, the very existence of a category called compelled
speech (or the right not to speak) is open to question, on the
ground that if a reasonable observer would know that one's
speech is compelled, that observer would not necessarily associ-
17. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
18. In addition to Barnette, see Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian &
Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils.
Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209
(1977); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
19. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997);
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) and 512 U.S. 622 (1994);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); Pruneyard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969).
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ate the content of the speech with the speaker, and therefore, so
long as dissent is open, the Free Speech Clause is, arguably, not
violated. I have written about this elsewhere.20
For present purposes, I want to discuss neither the general
category of compelled speech nor the difficult distinctions
among the compelled speech cases. Rather, I want to focus on
one of the cases, Abood. There, the Court struck down govern-
mentally compelled fees from nonunion members when used by
the union to support ideological causes. 21 The portion of the
dues used for ideological causes would have to be refunded. The
Abood principle writ large would dramatically change the way gov-
ernment operates: all taxpayers would be eligible for pro rata
refunds for government speech with which they disagree (e.g.
National Endowment for Democracy, National Endowment for
the Arts, public schools, libraries, museums, etc.). No court,
though, has come close to applying Abood this broadly. Perhaps
this is because of administrative concerns: i.e., perhaps in theory
Abood should be applied broadly to include taxpayer pro rata
refunds, but in practice this would be too cumbersome. Or,
maybe the theory behind Abood is limited to compelled speech in
a narrower setting, such as unions or bar associations. Whatever
the reason for the failure to extend Abood, there is no serious
chance it will be extended.22
The Abood principle, it seems to me, has great salience in the
free exercise area.23 Forcing me to support another's religion
undercuts a core free exercise value, by disrupting the voluntarist
baseline of free exercise. Perhaps Abood should be writ large in
the religion setting where it will not be in the speech setting;
perhaps we ought to read the Free Exercise Clause as compelling
pro rata refunds of taxpayer money used for vouchers to support
someone else's religious schools. Note that this approach would
20. See Greene, supra note 11.
21. The portion of the fees used for collective bargaining was allowed to
stand, on the theory that such bargaining benefited nonunion members and
union members alike, and because of free-rider concerns. See Abood, 431 U.S. at
221-23.
22. I would argue that Abood itself was incorrectly decided. No reasonable
observer would attribute the union's ideological speech to any particular
member, and any given member retains full rights to dissent, on his or her own
nickel, from the union's position. Thus, we should conclude that the Free
Speech Clause was not violated. The Free Exercise Clause, though, embodies
different concerns, which I discuss in the text.
23. Cf Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L.
REv. 195, 210 (1992) (suggesting a similar application of Abood, but under the
Establishment Clause).
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not invalidate vouchers generally; a refund requirement is differ-
ent from a facial invalidation.
To extend the Abood principle for religion while not
extending it for nonreligious speech requires an argument that
religion is special, distinctive. This is the big issue confronting
religion clause scholars today: to what extent must we treat reli-
gion as distinctive for both establishment and free exercise pur-
poses? The racial equal protection cases, from Brown 4 through
Adarand,25 have instantiated a vigorous principle of formal equal-
ity in our constitutional jurisprudence. According to this princi-
ple, government may neither favor nor disfavor citizens based on
race, gender, religion, and perhaps sexual orientation. Applied
to the religion clauses, we see the Court and commentators
increasingly permitting support for religion so long as such sup-
port is part of a more general package, and rejecting exemptions
and accommodations for religion unless those exemptions and
accommodations are themselves general.26 To overcome this
application of formal equality to the religion clauses, one needs a
persuasive theory of religious distinctiveness, of how the Estab-
lishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause sometimes require
religion to be specially disfavored and specially favored.
I have argued elsewhere that religious faith is different in
kind from secular faith, to nonbelievers and believers alike, and
therefore, that laws based predominantly on express religious
argumentation should be invalid under the Establishment
Clause, for they specially disenfranchise nonbelievers who have
no access to the extrahuman source of normative authority back-
ing such laws.27 As a counterweight to this disfavoring, I have
argued that the Free Exercise Clause requires exemptions for
religious practice from general legislation, at least as a prima
facie matter.2" In this way, there is a political balance of the reli-
gion clauses; we keep religion out of politics and politics out of
religion.
Can such an argument extend to vouchers, to require pro
rata refunds for taxpayer money used for vouchers to support
someone else's religious schools? I think it can. If we accept the
argument that religion is a distinctive form of belief, then even if
we do not accept Abood, or do not accept its extension to broad
24. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
26. See Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 63-70 (1996).
27. See Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102
YALE LJ. 1611, 1614-33 (1993).
28. Id. at 1633-43.
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taxpayer relief, we can still accept the Abood principle applied to
compelled exaction of money from me to pay for your church
school. Such compulsion disrupts the voluntarist baseline of our
conception of free exercise, and an exemption from that portion
of my tax money that goes to fund the religious schools of others
both restores that baseline and provides an appropriate counter-
weight to the disabilities required by the Establishment Clause.
Ill. Doc-riNE AND VOUCHERS
Current Supreme Court Establishment Clause doctrine
would invalidate some voucher programs, while allowing others.
Four factors are relevant when examining public aid to religious
schools. First, is the program general, i.e., does it fund religious
schools only or religious schools as part of a larger package? Sec-
ond, is the funding direct, i.e., does the government money go
straight to the religious school, or does it pass through other
hands first? Third, is the choice of where the funds go dictated
by the government or by private citizens? Fourth, is the govern-
ment money that goes to the religious school segregated there
for nondoctrinal uses?
In Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist,"9 the Court invalidated a New York law providing for tui-
tion reimbursement and tax deductions for parents of children
attending secular and religious private schools. Although the
money did not go directly to the religious schools, and although
parents and not the government chose how the money was used,
the law flunked the first and fourth factors listed above. That is,
the law was deemed not general because it benefited private
schools only, and not public schools. The Court reached this
conclusion even though the aid benefited both secular and reli-
gious private schools. Additionally, the law did not ensure that
the aid was eventually used for nondoctrinal purposes only.
In Mueller v. Allen,"0 the Court upheld a Minnesota law
allowing tax deductions for tuition, textbook, and transportion
expenses for parents of children in both public schools and in
secular and religious private schools. As in Nyquist, the second
and third factors were easily met-the money did not go directly
to the coffers of the religious schools, and individual parents
rather than the government chose the beneficiaries. Although
arguably the deductions for textbook and transportation
expenses were properly segregated to ensure that such funds
were not used for doctrinal purposes, no such segregation was
29. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
30. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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required for tuition expenses. The Court was silent on this
fourth factor, however; in upholding the Minnesota law, it
neither discussed this aspect of Nyquist nor attempted to distin-
guish it. On the first factor, the Court distinguished Nyquist by
reasoning that whereas the New York program was insufficiently
general, failing to include public school expenses, the Minnesota
program solved that problem by permitting deductions for both
public and private schools.
As I understand the case law, focusing on Nyquist and Muel-
ler, a voucher program that satisfied factors one, two, and three
would be upheld. That is, it would have to be sufficiently gen-
eral, benefiting public and private schools alike, with private
schools including secular and religious; funds could not go
directly to the religious school coffers; and the choice of where
government money flowed would have to be made by individual
citizens rather than by the government. The fourth factor-
whether the funds in question are segregated to ensure they do
not go to doctrinal uses-seems irrelevant after Mueller.
The Wisconsin law at issue in the most famous state voucher
case to date satisfies neither factor one nor two; yet, the state
supreme court upheld the law."' The law allows a certain per-
centage of students in the Milwaukee public schools to attend
private schools-either secular or religious-at taxpayer
expense. The state must send the check for the tuition money to
the private school, and the parent or guardian must restrictively
endorse the check for the private school's use. This program
fails the first factor because, like the program in Nyquist, it funds
only private schools (albeit secular and religious) and not public
schools also. It fails the second factor because the money flow
cannot fairly be deemed indirect. By requiring that the check be
sent to the private school, made out to the parent but restrictively
endorsed to the school, the law requires what can only be consid-
ered a direct payment to the school. Regarding the first factor,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court failed to see the difference
between Nyquist and Mueller. Although the court explained that
the third factor was met-parental rather than governmental
choice of schools-it failed to discuss the second factor, indirect-
ness, which was not met. The Wisconsin law should have been
invalidated. With some adjustments-providing a more general
voucher program to include public schools as well as private
ones; requiring that the voucher money go to the parents, with
the parents then sending the voucher money to the schools in
31. SeeJackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wisc.), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct.
466 (1998).
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question 32-voucher programs such as Wisconsin's should be
upheld, under current case law.
IV. RECONSIDERING PIERCE
33
Underlying the voucher debate is a question about the
proper division of authority between parent and state over chil-
dren. Children are not generally deemed fully autonomous;
someone other than a child must be in charge of many aspects of
the child's life. We generally permit parents great leeway regard-
ing decisionmaking for their children, but we do so, I believe,
not because the parents have "rights" over their children, but
rather because, for a variety of reasons, parents are in a better
position than the state to make such decisions. Parental choice
regarding their children is subject to state intervention when the
parent abuses or neglects the child, and this can involve physical,
emotional, medical, and, I would argue, educational abuse or
neglect. Although I would not suggest that sending children to
private schools (or home-schooling the children) rises to paren-
tal abuse or neglect, there is another argument that the Pierce
"right" to send children to private school should be
reconsidered.
Our constitutional structure is one of multiple repositories
of power, and it is irreducible.34 By multiple repositories of
power, I refer to the various mechanisms by which power is frac-
tured; these include structural devices such as separation of pow-
ers, judicial review, and federalism, as well as various rights, such
as speech, press, voting, and petition (the political process
rights) plus religion and family (the rights to form separate com-
munities of value). By irreducible, I mean that our constitutional
structure is predicated on no foundation, neither of centralized
power nor of fractured rights, and on a theory neither of democ-
racy nor of liberty. The assumption that parents must have the
right to school their children as they wish violates both of these
32. Even with this correction, voucher programs would still exhibit a
problem different from that present in either Nyquist or Mueller. In those cases,
parents received tax breaks or tuition reimbursement; no money of any kind
went from government to school. In a voucher program, voucher money
targeted for education might be sent first to parents, but they could then spend
that money only by sending it on to the school. Thus, the government's money,
embodied in the voucher, would end up in the school's coffers. This is a more
direct connection between government and religious school than was present
in either Nyquist or Mueller, and it will certainly be a ground for arguing the
invalidity of voucher programs.
33. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
34. See Greene, supra note 3.
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principles. It assumes a foundation of fractured rights over cen-
tralized authority by assuming that parents must (finances per-
mitting) have the power to exit the local public school system
and teach their children as they wish (subject to some, minimal
state oversight). In so doing, the Pierce assumption-although,
on one view, assuring multiple repositories of power by counter-
acting the state's schooling monopoly-in fact ensures that chil-
dren will get their basic education not from multiple sources, but
rather from their parents or their parents' agents alone. Requir-
ing all children to attend public schools, while leaving parents
free during non-public-school hours to teach their children at
home or at church or synagogue, would ensure that all children
are exposed to multiple sources of authority and of knowledge.
Overruling Pierce would free up funds used for private schooling
and would direct parental energies at improving the public
schools. Different public schools would, of course, focus on dif-
ferent values, and parents would still therefore have significant
input into the curriculum of their local public schools. But we
would remove some children from the monopoly of their parents
and substitute a plural system of education.
This argument against Pierce might seem in tension with my
earlier argument supporting pro rata refunds for taxpayer money
used for religious schools. That argument depended upon a
robust conception of free exercise, of the rights of religious peo-
ple to exit the public order through (prima facie) exemptions
from generally applicable law when such law infringes on reli-
gious belief and practice. My argument against Pierce seems to
privilege the centralized authority, and seems to neglect my ear-
lier argument for opt-outs. The two arguments are, however,
consistent. The earlier argument for exemptions did not con-
sider the unique status of children. Because children are prop-
erly deemed not fully autonomous, they cannot be the recipients
of exemption rights as adults are. We could, of course, extend
the exemption argument to the rearing of children. That is, we
could defend Pierce on the ground that the Free Exercise Clause
requires exemptions from the public school system (or, more
generally and problematically, that this is required by substantive
due process, to include secular as well as religious schools). By
insisting that all children attend public school, one might argue,
we do harm to those religions that do not countenance exposing
their children to multiple sources of value, both those of the
public school and the home and religious institution. By overrul-
ing Pierce, the argument would go, we would establish a new
foundationalism of centralized power, contradicting my earlier
defense of a system of exemptions.
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We cannot, however, have it both ways. Either we require
public schooling, ensuring that children are exposed to multiple
sources of value, or we keep Pierce, counteracting the public
school monopoly but ensuring that the formal education of chil-
dren is dictated solely by parental choice. The first option harms
religions that insist on nonexposure to competition; the second
option harms the ability of each child to become an adult who
can then choose what sort of religious or secular life he or she
wishes to lead. The anti-foundationalism and multiple reposito-
ries of power predicates of our constitutional order, it seems to
me, mandate the first option.
